Backward edge Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) has been widely supported via user-space shadow stacks. In this paper we introduce innovative kernel shadow stacks for user-space programs. By placing itself at a higher privilege level, the information kept by the kernel shadow stack can no way be altered by the (attacked) user-level code. We provide the main hints of our implementation of the kernel shadow stack for Linux, and report data related to an assessment we carried out of our proposal.

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Poster: On the Usage of Kernel Shadow Stacks for User-Level Programs

  • Marco Calavaro,
  • Pasquale Caporaso,
  • Luca Capotombolo,
  • Giuseppe Bianchi,
  • Francesco Quaglia

摘要

Backward edge Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) has been widely supported via user-space shadow stacks. In this paper we introduce innovative kernel shadow stacks for user-space programs. By placing itself at a higher privilege level, the information kept by the kernel shadow stack can no way be altered by the (attacked) user-level code. We provide the main hints of our implementation of the kernel shadow stack for Linux, and report data related to an assessment we carried out of our proposal.