In the present chapter, we finally ask ourselves whether, in the face of the threat posed by the right-wing populism of Donald Trump, the global political left will be able to free itself from elements of libertarian ideology and find its way towards a movement for social democracy in the tradition of Karl Polanyi (1886–1964), open to the values of global religions. One of the main features of a new paradigm of the left, which we call the “Kalecki/Steindl” paradigm would be Today, we witness a global confrontation between the radical right and green and left-libertarian politics. And isn’t the so-called culturally progressive politics of the green and left-libertarian camp part and parcel of the alienation between the working class and the left that contributes to the electoral victories of right-wing populist parties? Our analysis of the global distribution of political and social values, defined by the traditional left–right axis of political orientation and the four factors of our empirical investigation, shows that the more moderate global left, with a self-identification of “3” on the 10-point left–right scale, is the one that most strongly rejects the traditional sexual morality of the major world religions, and is the one that is least characterised by strong religious belief and religious activism. Interestingly, the adherents of the extreme left ideology today are far less likely to reject the traditional sexual morality of the major world religions, and far more likely to be highly religiously devout and religiously active than most other shades of adherents of a left ideology, and in this way must be seen as a terrain of hope for the leaderships of the major world religions. In this chapter, we also present the surprising results of the correlation analysis of the rejection of traditional sexual morality with the attitudes to democracy expressed by the citizens of our globe. While there is virtually no correlation between rejection of traditional sexual morality and agreeing that in a democracy governments should tax the rich and subsidise the poor, and that in a democracy people should receive state unemployment benefits, there is a negative correlation between rejection of traditional sexual morality and agreeing that in a democracy the state should equalise people’s incomes. More and more, the trajectory of socialism on our globe is thus becoming “southern” and more religious, while the secularist West is becoming anti-egalitarian. We also present some partial correlations between our Religious Morality Index on a country-by-country basis and indicators of socio-economic development, using the Human Development Index and its square to account for non-linear development effects. Religious morality is closely linked to the new potential for economic growth in the Global South, and to environmental justice, both domestically (Happy Planet Index) and internationally (not exporting ecological footprint). High religious morality is also characteristic of the Islamic world. Finally, we also present a regression model for the average religious morality index of supporters of different political parties around the world. Again, a non-linear development effect plays an important role: as can be seen from the religious morality index of political party supporters, religious morality rises and then falls with increasing human development, and the regression equation explains 62% of the total variance. Rather than different ideologies, it is country trends towards secularisation that determine the religious morality of the supporters of 431 political parties in the world. Finally, we can present lists of political parties on the right and left of the political spectrum whose supporters have an exceptionally high and an exceptionally low average religious morality index. In a final analytical perspective, we show that lower than expected religious morality indices are naturally found not only among supporters of the political left, but also among supporters of the political right in the countries of the centre and in the countries of the global periphery. From this perspective, the political left would be well advised to embrace religious social democratic and other religious ‘progressive’ currents and to treat religious communities as partners in an alliance for better and more ecologically responsible societies in the traditions of religious socialism of Karl Polanyi. At the end of our journey, we can only say, with the late Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, that with liberal democracy embattled, public discourse toxic, family life disintegrating, and drug abuse and depression on the rise, many fear what the future holds. Today’s crisis is linked to our loss of a strong, shared moral code and our elevation of self-interest over the common good. We have outsourced morality to the market and the state, but neither is capable of showing us how to live. There is no freedom without morality and no freedom without responsibility, and we must all play our part in rebuilding a common moral foundation. As the newly elected Pope Leo XIV put it in his speech of 10 May 2025: the lack of faith often leads to tragedies such as the loss of meaning in life, the forgetting of mercy, the violation of human dignity in its most dramatic forms, the crisis of the family and many other wounds from which our society suffers greatly.