In this chapter, we propose that contextual ethics combines two commitments. One is the minimalistic metaethical assumption that ethics arises as part of and can only be approached through an understanding of a specific context and thus is irreducibly shaped by context, and the other is a commitment to a way of doing work in moral philosophy that honours this metaethical view by acknowledging that investigating and describing a moral issue in context and understanding the normative challenges it poses are two sides of the same coin. To provide some background for these commitments, we describe the historical roots of a contextualised approach to ethics and provide an overview of some major influences. We then offer one way to spell out the two core commitments. The metaethical commitment is developed in terms of a rejection of the ideas of a moral domain and a settled fact-value dichotomy combined with a commitment to the contextuality of ethics that brings out how in moral philosophy, descriptive and normative work is connected. The methodological commitment is developed through a survey of some of the many different ways in which context can be brought into prominence in philosophical investigations. In general, we aim to provide a framework for contextual ethics that shows the importance, and indeed necessity, of increased attention to context in contemporary philosophy.