Contextual ethics is not a thing, but perhaps it should be? Or, perhaps it should be many? There is, after all, not much sense in stressing the importance of context out of context; so, the idea of there being one sense of, and one importance of, ‘context’ is, in a way, a thought that goes against the point of the essays in this book. For that reason, it may be better to introduce the term ‘contextual ethics’ negatively: contextual ethics is rooted in the recognition that a philosophy that seeks one overarching approach, that ought to be relevant for and applicable to any scene of importance for philosophy, runs the risk of distorting the object it seeks to understand. Even though it may be problematic to call contextual ethics ‘a method’, there are a number of things that unite the essays here collected. The importance of attending to context is of course the central one. But what that, more precisely, means is not very easy to make clear—for if there’s anything one can say at a general level about ‘contexts’, it is that they vary. These variations and differences are not to be neglected.