In the context of disaster response, information is crucial for adequate decision-making. This raises the question of an ethical duty to seek evidence. The paper at hand explores the ethical justification of this duty, addressing the complexities of moral responsibility when morally relevant decisions have to be made and respective actions have to be taken when insufficient information is available. The main ethical problem lies in the potential moral responsibility for actions committed because of ignorance (in the sense of Aristotle), which, intuitively, could be considered as being involuntary. To deal with this issue, the paper at hand proposes an epistemic diachronic ethical duty to seek more evidence in the context of disaster response and justifies it within a consequentialist ethical framework, which, as such, particularly requires minimising the costs and maximising the value of the evidence obtained. While the integration of geo-informatics technologies has the potential to significantly reduce costs and increase the quality of evidence, enhancing decision-making outcomes, it also raises new ethical challenges, including biases, discrimination, and privacy concerns. The paper also briefly addresses possible justification approaches within deontological and aretaic ethics. It is argued that further research on the ethical integration of emerging technologies is needed, which, in particular, involves understanding cultural differences in disaster response and developing comprehensive training programs for disaster professionals to navigate these ethical dilemmas effectively.

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On the Ethical Value of Evidence in Disaster Response

  • Diogo Sasdelli,
  • Thomas J. Lampoltshammer

摘要

In the context of disaster response, information is crucial for adequate decision-making. This raises the question of an ethical duty to seek evidence. The paper at hand explores the ethical justification of this duty, addressing the complexities of moral responsibility when morally relevant decisions have to be made and respective actions have to be taken when insufficient information is available. The main ethical problem lies in the potential moral responsibility for actions committed because of ignorance (in the sense of Aristotle), which, intuitively, could be considered as being involuntary. To deal with this issue, the paper at hand proposes an epistemic diachronic ethical duty to seek more evidence in the context of disaster response and justifies it within a consequentialist ethical framework, which, as such, particularly requires minimising the costs and maximising the value of the evidence obtained. While the integration of geo-informatics technologies has the potential to significantly reduce costs and increase the quality of evidence, enhancing decision-making outcomes, it also raises new ethical challenges, including biases, discrimination, and privacy concerns. The paper also briefly addresses possible justification approaches within deontological and aretaic ethics. It is argued that further research on the ethical integration of emerging technologies is needed, which, in particular, involves understanding cultural differences in disaster response and developing comprehensive training programs for disaster professionals to navigate these ethical dilemmas effectively.