In Chap. 2 a moral-political conception was outlined that I am calling legal paternalism, on which (a) the state, or someone acting under the state’s authority, has the right to use coercion against the will of adult individuals even when the their choices are informed, uncoerced, and sufficiently coherent, and (b) such coercive power is legitimate only so long as it is exercised primarily to protect what are understood to be these persons’ interests, or what is understood as being good for them, and in particular to make sure that the actions they take or fail to take (or otherwise attempt to take or to avoid) do not harm them or put them at risk of harm (or what is understood to be such), be it physical, psychophysical, economic, or of any other nature. For simplicity’s sake, this conception will henceforth simply be referred to as paternalism (short for legal paternalism).