In this introduction, we seek to highlight the central role of trust in combating disinformation. Currently, four main narratives dominate the discourse on disinformation: an epistemic narrative, a technological narrative, a normative narrative, and a social narrative. Each of these offers a distinct explanation of the problem and suggests a different approach to addressing it. Yet, as we argue, the success of all these approaches ultimately depends on whom potential recipients of disinformation decide to trust. Trust, we suggest, is an often overlooked but crucial dimension in the effort to mitigate disinformation. In a further step, we connect these four narratives to corresponding notions of trust developed in the philosophical literature. We also briefly examine how recent advances in image-generative AI – including the rise of deepfakes – have expanded the domain of testimony, thereby heightening the importance of trust in acquiring information. We then outline both the philosophical and practical difficulties involved in defining disinformation. And finally, we will develop an argument showing that trust is always embedded within holistic networks of trust and distrust spanning multiple sources and institutions.

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Trust, Testimony and Technology: What Makes It So Hard to Combat Disinformation?

  • Michael Herrmann,
  • Andreas Kaminski,
  • Jörn Wiengarn

摘要

In this introduction, we seek to highlight the central role of trust in combating disinformation. Currently, four main narratives dominate the discourse on disinformation: an epistemic narrative, a technological narrative, a normative narrative, and a social narrative. Each of these offers a distinct explanation of the problem and suggests a different approach to addressing it. Yet, as we argue, the success of all these approaches ultimately depends on whom potential recipients of disinformation decide to trust. Trust, we suggest, is an often overlooked but crucial dimension in the effort to mitigate disinformation. In a further step, we connect these four narratives to corresponding notions of trust developed in the philosophical literature. We also briefly examine how recent advances in image-generative AI – including the rise of deepfakes – have expanded the domain of testimony, thereby heightening the importance of trust in acquiring information. We then outline both the philosophical and practical difficulties involved in defining disinformation. And finally, we will develop an argument showing that trust is always embedded within holistic networks of trust and distrust spanning multiple sources and institutions.