My contribution concerns the ontological state of social facts as objects that fulfill social functions and those social facts that become institutional facts. Fundamental insights stem from John Searle’s philosophy of society presented in Making the Social World as an extension of the book The Construction of Social Reality. Classically, Searle distinguishes between brute physical facts and mental facts caused by the brain/world relationship. Mental facts can be unconscious or conscious. In the latter case, conscious mental states are intentional and can occur individually or collectively. Social facts depend on collective intentionality; for example, the value of a five-dollar bill is a social fact that depends on our agreement that a five-dollar bill is worth something. Social facts acquire a certain social status through the assignment of a status function (y counts as x in the context c) and require collective intentionality. Despite the assumption of a background of abilities and skills described in the book Intentionality, research on the nature of social facts may require an analysis of the mental processes carried out by a plausible model of extended mind, that investigates the human manipulation of the environment at the basis of the same status function. A promising vision shows the important relationship between abduction and extension, disembodiment and distribution of the mind to grasp the role of habits, rituals and symbols in human cognition. Lorenzo Magnani’s work, presented in Abduction, Reason and Science and in other important writings, introduces a fundamental “eco-cognitive” perspective that is based on the notion of “manipulative abduction”; the relationship between internal and external representations underlines the role of the environment in human cognition. Extending, disembodying and distributing the mind means that the human mind can delegate to external representations important cognitive functions already present in our environment.