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Hume failed to desynonymize anthropomorphism based on resemblance—a first principle of perception in A Treatise of Human Nature (1740)—from anthropocentrism, which Blake like Hume considered reductive and circular. As against Hume’s epistemological critique of induction, however, Chapter 3 argues that Blake endorsed the sort of constructive, non-vicious regress which the physicist John Norton recently set forth in his “material theory of induction,” grounded in the recognition that science is an evolving human project. Blake as a late-Enlightened social reformer embraced a practical, experimental,indeed experiential inductivism like Norton’s.

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The Tractates, Cont.: Bayesian Culture, Induction, and Berkeley’s Language of Nature

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Andrew M. Cooper

摘要

Hume failed to desynonymize anthropomorphism based on resemblance—a first principle of perception in A Treatise of Human Nature (1740)—from anthropocentrism, which Blake like Hume considered reductive and circular. As against Hume’s epistemological critique of induction, however, Chapter 3 argues that Blake endorsed the sort of constructive, non-vicious regress which the physicist John Norton recently set forth in his “material theory of induction,” grounded in the recognition that science is an evolving human project. Blake as a late-Enlightened social reformer embraced a practical, experimental,indeed experiential inductivism like Norton’s.