This chapter analyzes recruitment practices, career paths, and professional trajectories of senior officials in Latin American public administrations, with a focus on Argentina. It explores how different modes of access to high-level public positions shape state capacity and institutional stability amid political volatility. Rather than framing political loyalty and technical merit as opposites, the chapter examines the coexistence of multiple selection and career-building logics within the bureaucratic elite. Using a qualitative approach that combines regulatory analysis with semi-structured interviews conducted with senior officials and administrative experts, the study uncovers informal practices and deviations from formal rules. Findings show that despite merit-based frameworks, Argentina’s senior civil service is largely shaped by discretionary and temporary appointments. These generate high turnover, weaken institutional memory, and undermine professional development. Two main profiles emerge: insiders, who build careers through continuity and credentials, and outsiders, whose roles are tied to political cycles. The chapter concludes that the absence of political consensus and institutional continuity has hindered the consolidation of a professional civil service. In the context of fiscal austerity, anti-bureaucratic rhetoric, and mass dismissals, it advocates for gradual reforms that balance political responsiveness with technical expertise in senior public management.

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National Public Employment Office Recruitment, Careers, and Trajectories of Senior Officials in Latin American Public Administrations: Insights from Argentina

  • Salvador Parrado,
  • Nelson D. Cardozo

摘要

This chapter analyzes recruitment practices, career paths, and professional trajectories of senior officials in Latin American public administrations, with a focus on Argentina. It explores how different modes of access to high-level public positions shape state capacity and institutional stability amid political volatility. Rather than framing political loyalty and technical merit as opposites, the chapter examines the coexistence of multiple selection and career-building logics within the bureaucratic elite. Using a qualitative approach that combines regulatory analysis with semi-structured interviews conducted with senior officials and administrative experts, the study uncovers informal practices and deviations from formal rules. Findings show that despite merit-based frameworks, Argentina’s senior civil service is largely shaped by discretionary and temporary appointments. These generate high turnover, weaken institutional memory, and undermine professional development. Two main profiles emerge: insiders, who build careers through continuity and credentials, and outsiders, whose roles are tied to political cycles. The chapter concludes that the absence of political consensus and institutional continuity has hindered the consolidation of a professional civil service. In the context of fiscal austerity, anti-bureaucratic rhetoric, and mass dismissals, it advocates for gradual reforms that balance political responsiveness with technical expertise in senior public management.