In Exemplars of Truth, Keith Lehrer presents an impressive new epistemological theory. He continues to emphasize that knowledge and epistemic justification depend upon the capacity to rely upon a background system of beliefs, preference, and reasoning in a defense against potential objections. New to his theory is an attempt to explain how experience dynamically affects one’s background system by a process of exemplarization and generalization. Lehrer resists characterizing his view as foundationalist or as reintroducing the notion of an epistemological given. I argue that he has not adequately explained, however, how the truth security he finds in the possession of self-representing experiential exemplars is compatible with the corrigibility of all of our empirical judgments. I also argue that uncertainties in how to interpret his nominalism make for difficulties in figuring out how we reasonably generalize on these experiential exemplars. Nonetheless, I conclude by arguing that Lehrer’s central thesis that epistemic justification relies upon a background system facilitates a satisfactory response to Goodman‘s riddle regarding reasonable generalizations on observed samples.