Lehrer, Reid, and Trustworthiness
摘要
Keith Lehrer has had a major influence on contemporary epistemology, and he has played a vital role in renewing interest in the philosophy of Thomas Reid. Not coincidentally, the same type of common sense epistemological orientation as we find in Reid is evident in Lehrer’s epistemological writings, including in his most recent book, Exemplars of Truth. This chapter begins with a brief appreciation of both Lehrer and Reid, indicating some of the distinctive – and, I think, attractive -- features of Reid’s work, especially his epistemological views, features that Lehrer has helped to bring to light, and that are present in his own work. I then turn to one particular Reidian idea that has featured prominently in Lehrer’s writings. This is Reid’s First Principle 7 (FP7), which is closely related to Lehrer’s own principle of trustworthiness. I raise questions about Lehrer’s interpretation of this principle, about what (if anything) makes it special, and about the role that it plays in both Reid’s estimation and Lehrer’s. The hope is that the discussion will serve to highlight some of the most central and distinctive aspects of Lehrer’s epistemological views and also some points on which, in spite of the strong affinities between them, he and Reid appear to diverge.