Foundationalism and coherentism are typically seen as competing views. I argue that there is a way of fusing them together. A key principle of coherentism is that there can be no justification without meta-justification. It tells us that, when we form beliefs on the basis of perception, they are unjustified unless we have justification for taking perception to be reliable. This principle seems to make basic beliefs—beliefs whose justification doesn’t come from other beliefs—impossible. I argue that it doesn’t. The principle makes basic beliefs impossible only if nothing but beliefs can provide meta-justification. But basic justification remains possible if meta-justification can come from appearances. Assume you see and thus believe that there is an apple on the table. Foundationalists would say that your belief is justified by a visual apple appearance. A coherentist like Lehrer would say that your belief is justified only if you have justification for taking the apple appearance to be reliable. Suppose having such meta-justification ultimately comes from, not beliefs, but appearances that justify the attribution of reliability. In that case, Lehrer’s view is compatible with the claim that your apple belief is basic. In this paper, I explicate and defend a version of foundationalism along these lines.