In UltimateFreedom: Beyond Free Will (2024), Keith Lehrer contends that human beings possess a unique metamental capacity for robust freedom of choice—a capacity not possessed by any other animals. Lehrer argues that when a person S has a power preference concerning option A and that power preference is the ultimate explanation of S’s choosing A, then S’s choosing A is free in the sourcehood (“it’s up S”), leeway (“S could have chosen otherwise”), and agency (“agent causation”) senses of freedom (2024, 8). Lehrer also argues that freedom of choice so understood is logically consistent with determinism. In what follows, I challenge this consistency claim. In particular, I argue, first, that power preferences, as Lehrer characterizes them, aren’t (typically) “up to us” in any robust sense; second, that if a power preference is the ultimate explanation of my choosing A, then, given that power preference, I couldn’t have chosen otherwise; and third, that even if a power preference for my preference structure concerning A is the ultimate explanation for my choosing A (such that my choosing A “is up to me” in the sourcehood sense), the power preference itself isn’t free (in the leeway sense) if determinism is true. I begin by explicating the paradox of freedom and determinism as traditionally construed. I then present Lehrer’s power-preference-based metamental conception of freedom and his master argument for the consistency claim. I then turn to the challenges mentioned above. I conclude by questioning whether the metamental ability to reflect on first-order desires is unique to humans.