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The hybrid armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine began in 2014 in Donbas, followed by a full-scale phase that began on 24 February 2022 with an attack on all parts of the state border. The hybridity of this war involves military operations on the battlefield and information warfare. Although Russia has a considerably larger army and more military equipment, it cannot achieve its goals. Military analysts also indicate its complete failure in the information battleground. The article demonstrates how communication environments operate in both countries, the results of their work in the Ukrainian information space, and how Ukrainians share each party’s values. The information provided in the article is based on the data of a volunteer project. The project analyzes the war-themed posts on social media and provides its discoveries to the Ukrainian public and military authorities. The methods used in the study include content analysis and analysis of social media monitoring to spot the patterns of the Ukrainians’ reactions to the information grounds of the war and the messages communicated by both parties. The study reveals that the pro-Ukrainian discourse is mainly decentralized and not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. Military event communication occurs through connective modeling of reality, as it usually happens during mass protests and other powerful social movements. Thus, optimism about the outcomes of the war prevails in this discourse and mobilizes the participants to join efforts for future victory. The sources and structure of the Russian discourse are quite the opposite: they are centralized and do not allow any grassroots initiative for the citizens of Ukraine. Rarely do they discuss events about ordinary people or express personal opinions. In such circumstances, the communication system, built on the horizontal interaction of the active population, has a large margin of safety as opposed to the centralized propaganda machine and helps maintain fighting spirits in the hybrid aggression, which can provide significant motivation on the battlefield.

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Communication Activism Versus Propaganda Machine: How the Ukrainians Confront Russia on the Information Battleground

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Artem Zakharchenko,
  • Yevhen Luzan,
  • Olena Zakharchenko,
  • Oleksii Rohalov,
  • Olena Zinenko,
  • Yuliia Maksimtsova,
  • Yuliia Sysoyeva,
  • Maryna Fursenko,
  • Iryna Yefimchuk,
  • Solomiia Fedushko,
  • Yuriy Syerov,
  • Oleksandr Zinenko

摘要

The hybrid armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine began in 2014 in Donbas, followed by a full-scale phase that began on 24 February 2022 with an attack on all parts of the state border. The hybridity of this war involves military operations on the battlefield and information warfare. Although Russia has a considerably larger army and more military equipment, it cannot achieve its goals. Military analysts also indicate its complete failure in the information battleground. The article demonstrates how communication environments operate in both countries, the results of their work in the Ukrainian information space, and how Ukrainians share each party’s values. The information provided in the article is based on the data of a volunteer project. The project analyzes the war-themed posts on social media and provides its discoveries to the Ukrainian public and military authorities. The methods used in the study include content analysis and analysis of social media monitoring to spot the patterns of the Ukrainians’ reactions to the information grounds of the war and the messages communicated by both parties. The study reveals that the pro-Ukrainian discourse is mainly decentralized and not controlled by the Ukrainian authorities. Military event communication occurs through connective modeling of reality, as it usually happens during mass protests and other powerful social movements. Thus, optimism about the outcomes of the war prevails in this discourse and mobilizes the participants to join efforts for future victory. The sources and structure of the Russian discourse are quite the opposite: they are centralized and do not allow any grassroots initiative for the citizens of Ukraine. Rarely do they discuss events about ordinary people or express personal opinions. In such circumstances, the communication system, built on the horizontal interaction of the active population, has a large margin of safety as opposed to the centralized propaganda machine and helps maintain fighting spirits in the hybrid aggression, which can provide significant motivation on the battlefield.