This chapter builds on the essence of conflict outlined in Chapter 3 and turns to consider to a Lacanian-Hegelian perspective on peace. Lacanian-Hegelians scholars have been said to have given up on the possibility of peace altogether, and they themselves argue that peace is ‘not enough’ or ‘not an option’. While agreeing with these critiques, this chapter nonetheless refuses to see this as the last word on peace thinking. Therefore, in a somewhat surprising move, in this chapter I seek to reorient peace thinking by rethinking it from a Lacanian-Hegelian dialectical materialist perspective. The chapter begins with what Oliver Richmond identifies as the ‘problem of peace’. We then consider how the problem is shaped by a commitment by peace paradigms to an ontology of violence and explore attempts to defend an ontology of peace that aims to make peace primary and war as its aberration. Rejecting such attempts, I endorse an ontology grounded in lack or the incompleteness of material reality and draw out the implications of such ontology for rethinking peace thinking.

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Conflicting Ontologies of Peace Thinking

  • Timothy Bryar

摘要

This chapter builds on the essence of conflict outlined in Chapter 3 and turns to consider to a Lacanian-Hegelian perspective on peace. Lacanian-Hegelians scholars have been said to have given up on the possibility of peace altogether, and they themselves argue that peace is ‘not enough’ or ‘not an option’. While agreeing with these critiques, this chapter nonetheless refuses to see this as the last word on peace thinking. Therefore, in a somewhat surprising move, in this chapter I seek to reorient peace thinking by rethinking it from a Lacanian-Hegelian dialectical materialist perspective. The chapter begins with what Oliver Richmond identifies as the ‘problem of peace’. We then consider how the problem is shaped by a commitment by peace paradigms to an ontology of violence and explore attempts to defend an ontology of peace that aims to make peace primary and war as its aberration. Rejecting such attempts, I endorse an ontology grounded in lack or the incompleteness of material reality and draw out the implications of such ontology for rethinking peace thinking.