The EU-facilitated dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia did not begin with a grand vision or a well-defined plan but with a compromise. Instead of pushing Serbia to recognize the International Court of Justice’s 2010 advisory opinion, which concluded that Kosovo’s declaration of independence did not violate international law and that Serbia requested, the compromise was to open a new dialogue. The previous chapter outlines the factors that pushed Kosovo to accept this new dialogue. This chapter examines the start of the normalization dialogue or the technical phase as it is widely referred to. What had changed in 2011 was not so much the positions of the two sides but the urgency with which the EU—particularly its new diplomatic body, the European External Action Service (EEAS)—needed a success story. The dialogue was as much about proving that the EU could act as a coherent foreign policy actor as it was about resolving anything between Kosovo and Serbia. The first meetings were held in Brussels in March 2011, chaired by Robert Cooper, a British diplomat known for his no-nonsense style. The initial agreements—on civil registry, freedom of movement, and customs stamps—were framed as technical steps. However, each required political courage. For Kosovo, agreeing to mutual recognition of customs stamps effectively admitted that Serbia was a separate trading partner. For Serbia, agreeing to freedom of movement meant allowing Kosovo ID cards to function as valid travel documents. Neither was a small step. However, these initial agreements did succeed in reducing some daily frictions for people on the ground. Buses and trucks moved more freely. Citizens crossed borders with less hassle. However, the more profound political tensions remained intact and, in some cases, even hardened.