This chapter aims to set the stage for the analysis of the normalization dialogue in Chapters 3 and 4 , which examine the technical and political dialogue phases of the EU-led efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. By outlining the key factors that precipitated the launch of the dialogue, this chapter explains why it was imposed in the first place—even after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had confirmed Kosovo’s independence in 2010. In doing so, the chapter highlights a critical shift in international priorities: whereas, until 2010, the emphasis had been mainly on supporting Kosovo’s state-building and state consolidation process, after 2010, the focus gradually turned to addressing Serbia’s concerns as an “injured party” and mitigating the potential fallout for what the West (the United States and the EU) viewed as democratic forces in the country, specifically those around President Tadić.

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Why the Normalization Dialogue?

  • Ramadan Ilazi,
  • Bekim Çollaku,
  • Fisnik Rexhepi

摘要

This chapter aims to set the stage for the analysis of the normalization dialogue in Chapters 3 and 4 , which examine the technical and political dialogue phases of the EU-led efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. By outlining the key factors that precipitated the launch of the dialogue, this chapter explains why it was imposed in the first place—even after the International Court of Justice (ICJ) had confirmed Kosovo’s independence in 2010. In doing so, the chapter highlights a critical shift in international priorities: whereas, until 2010, the emphasis had been mainly on supporting Kosovo’s state-building and state consolidation process, after 2010, the focus gradually turned to addressing Serbia’s concerns as an “injured party” and mitigating the potential fallout for what the West (the United States and the EU) viewed as democratic forces in the country, specifically those around President Tadić.