This chapter focuses on justice-based considerations that emerge in the debate about the ethics of human genetic enhancement, including the potential for genetic enhancement to impact the moral equality of persons, concerns about the fair distribution of the benefits of genetic enhancement, and ways in which genetic enhancement could be used that are unjustly discriminatory. It is argued that the genetic enhancement enterprise (GEE) will fail to meet some minimal requirements for being just, especially for those who are the least well-off in society, but that other values (such as liberty and well-being) may prevent it from being morally unacceptable. However, the GEE may become severely unjust (and thereby morally reprehensible) if: (1) it does not help to remedy existing injustices, if it can help to do so; (2) it amplifies existing inequalities, for example, by changing the requirements for participation in the dominant cooperative framework in manner that is exclusionary rather than inclusive; (3) it creates new injustice(s) that cannot be adequately addressed via fair and effective policy; and (4) it fails to adequately protect those who choose not to participate in the GEE from being unable to access resources for satisfying their basic needs.

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Enhancing Injustice: Justice and the Ethics of Human Genetic Enhancement

  • Ryan Tonkens

摘要

This chapter focuses on justice-based considerations that emerge in the debate about the ethics of human genetic enhancement, including the potential for genetic enhancement to impact the moral equality of persons, concerns about the fair distribution of the benefits of genetic enhancement, and ways in which genetic enhancement could be used that are unjustly discriminatory. It is argued that the genetic enhancement enterprise (GEE) will fail to meet some minimal requirements for being just, especially for those who are the least well-off in society, but that other values (such as liberty and well-being) may prevent it from being morally unacceptable. However, the GEE may become severely unjust (and thereby morally reprehensible) if: (1) it does not help to remedy existing injustices, if it can help to do so; (2) it amplifies existing inequalities, for example, by changing the requirements for participation in the dominant cooperative framework in manner that is exclusionary rather than inclusive; (3) it creates new injustice(s) that cannot be adequately addressed via fair and effective policy; and (4) it fails to adequately protect those who choose not to participate in the GEE from being unable to access resources for satisfying their basic needs.