In several Latin American countries, amid the so-called “left turn,” progressive forces forged, from the subnational level, a path that allowed them to gain legitimacy, accumulate political and executive experience, and reach the national government. In this context the Peruvian case is striking, as a deviant or negative case: Although Lima’s voters elected Susana Villarán —for the center-left Fuerza Social party— as mayor of Lima in 2010, her failure meant that the Peruvian Left could not follow a similar course to that which followed many other countries in the region. Here we argue that the failure of Villarán’s administration (2010–2014) is a consequence of the underestimation of her adversaries, overestimation of her political support and her administrative capabilities, and woeful political management expressed in a dearth of priorities. Villarán ended her term saddled with very low approval levels, a position of political isolation, a reputation for inefficiency, and estrangement from the popular sectors. Worse still, in 2019, Villarán admitted to having received illegal political financing from Brazilian construction companies during her administration, such that she ended up marked not only by the stigma of inefficiency but that of corruption too.

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From Capital City to National Government: The Failure of the Peruvian Left

  • Martín Tanaka

摘要

In several Latin American countries, amid the so-called “left turn,” progressive forces forged, from the subnational level, a path that allowed them to gain legitimacy, accumulate political and executive experience, and reach the national government. In this context the Peruvian case is striking, as a deviant or negative case: Although Lima’s voters elected Susana Villarán —for the center-left Fuerza Social party— as mayor of Lima in 2010, her failure meant that the Peruvian Left could not follow a similar course to that which followed many other countries in the region. Here we argue that the failure of Villarán’s administration (2010–2014) is a consequence of the underestimation of her adversaries, overestimation of her political support and her administrative capabilities, and woeful political management expressed in a dearth of priorities. Villarán ended her term saddled with very low approval levels, a position of political isolation, a reputation for inefficiency, and estrangement from the popular sectors. Worse still, in 2019, Villarán admitted to having received illegal political financing from Brazilian construction companies during her administration, such that she ended up marked not only by the stigma of inefficiency but that of corruption too.