At the end of Chap. 2 , I outlined how past and present political rhetoric has framed Chinese Indonesians as an insular group of ‘forever foreigners’ (Tuan, 1998). This rhetoric paints Chinese Indonesians as individuals whose actions in politics, the economy, and broader society serve the interests of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) (Fealy & Ricci, 2019; Setijadi, 2016b). Recent attitudinal surveys reflect how reductive views of Chineseness remain widespread in the general public. For example, Setijadi’s (2017) survey of the ‘pribumi public’ showed persistent stereotypes of Chinese Indonesians being disproportionately wealthy, refusing to integrate into Indonesian society, and (due to their assumed loyalty to PRC) being unsuited for positions of political power. Though such anti-Chinese sentiment peaked following Ahok’s arrest in 2017, Mietzner and Muhtadi’s (2019) survey of attitudes towards religious and ethnic minorities two years later showed that over a third of non-Chinese Indonesian Muslims still “held strong socio-racial prejudices against ethnic Chinese” (p. 159). Together these studies reveal a dominant narrative in which Chineseness is perceived as a monolithic ethnic identity—one that stands apart from and in opposition to the broader Indonesian populace.