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This chapter generalizes previous auction formats by allowing the winning bidder to pay the kth highest bid, while all losing bidders pay zero. This implies that in the first-price auction, we have that \(k=1\) , as the winning bidder pays the highest bid; and in the second-price auction, \(k=2\) , as he pays the second-highest bid. A similar argument applies to the third-price auction, where \(k=3\) , as the winning bidder pays the third-highest bid, and, more generally, to any other auction format where \(k>3\) .

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Third-Price Auctions, kth-Price Auctions, and Lotteries

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Pak-Sing Choi,
  • Felix Munoz-Garcia

摘要

This chapter generalizes previous auction formats by allowing the winning bidder to pay the kth highest bid, while all losing bidders pay zero. This implies that in the first-price auction, we have that \(k=1\) , as the winning bidder pays the highest bid; and in the second-price auction, \(k=2\) , as he pays the second-highest bid. A similar argument applies to the third-price auction, where \(k=3\) , as the winning bidder pays the third-highest bid, and, more generally, to any other auction format where \(k>3\) .