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In this chapter, we analyze first-price auctions, where every bidder privately observes his valuation for the object and submits his bid to the seller (e.g., in a sealed envelope). The seller ranks all bids, selects as a winner the bidder who submitted the highest bid to pay the bid he submitted. All other bidders pay zero and not receive the object.

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First-Price Auctions

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Pak-Sing Choi,
  • Felix Munoz-Garcia

摘要

In this chapter, we analyze first-price auctions, where every bidder privately observes his valuation for the object and submits his bid to the seller (e.g., in a sealed envelope). The seller ranks all bids, selects as a winner the bidder who submitted the highest bid to pay the bid he submitted. All other bidders pay zero and not receive the object.