There has recently been a resurgence of interest in defending the value-free ideal (VFI). Many of these defenses are similar in style: the VFI is supposed to play the role of a regulative ideal. In this chapter, I examine what it would mean for the VFI to play the role of a regulative ideal in light of the argument from inductive risk and assess what kind of guidance the VFI could provide. I argue that the VFI (on its own) is not very determinate: it gives too little guidance on how to make decisions in which values are required. In fact, we can almost always expect better guidance to be available via appeals to more fundamental normative goods, the same normative goods that might motivate value free idealists. These normative goods, however, are not synonymous with the VFI, are conceptually richer than the VFI, and do not uniquely recommend the VFI. I suggest there are good reasons to appeal to these goods rather than the VFI, and doing so places philosophical discussions on richer ground. Thus, we have good reasons to stop talking about the value free ideal.