The text starts by making some historical considerations, both on the persistence of political violence and on the relations between civil and military elites, which allow us to “understand” the Colombian peculiarity: the country in South America with the least military coups and the lack of a clear distinction between the tasks of the Military Forces and the Police, as well as the political alignment with the United States. After the period of the only military government in the twentieth century (1953–1958), a formula of civil–military relations based on “formal subordination and real autonomy”will be established. The changes introduced by the 1991 Constitution are then analyzed, as well as the impact of the Military Reform within the framework of the so-called Plan Colombia, financed mainly by the United States, and how once the talks between the government and the FARC began in Havana, a process of reforms began within the Forces to prepare for the Post-Agreement, with the so-called Damascus Doctrine playing a central role, but also showing how there is no linearity in the progress. Later, a government that some consider to be center-left won the Presidency, which proposed the policy called “Total Peace” and with changes in the Security policy placing “Human Security” at the center. The Public Force has experienced the tensions inherent to these changes, but showing the subordination to the civil power.