In a region characterized by diverse and well-known cases of military influence in politics and significant degrees of military autonomy from political power, Argentina looks like the brightest of the not-too-many exceptions. In Argentina, the laws carefully limit military powers and establish civilian leadership and control structures for the Armed Forces similar to those in force in consolidated democracies, and the aforementioned Forces comply with the orders of political power. A civilian Ministry of Defense with adequate advisory bodies and defense policy formulation, with broad participation and even civilian predominance, is in charge of preparing and executing that policy, reporting to it a strengthened Joint Chiefs of Staff, which is in charge of all the functions of joint military action. Despite this seemingly ideal situation, the country has very little real defense capacity, its reduced defense budget is mostly invested in solving a disproportionate military personnel structure, the equipment is largely old and even obsolete, and even a fund created by Congress for military re-equipment in 2020 is invested mainly in acquisitions that contribute little to defense. Although the country has an appreciable number of civilian academic defense experts, as well as a good number of well-educated military officers, the country’s poor defense situation has not ceased to draw the attention of researchers from various countries. The paper includes a brief theoretical conceptual framework on civil-military relations and defense policy, to then examine the current situation in both aspects, then performing an analysis of the causes, both immediate and deep, linked to civil-military relations and from other origins, which have produced the poor situation in which Argentina finds itself in terms of defense, also including proposals to overcome the indicated situation.