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This chapter presents the so-called paradoxes of choice proposed by Maurice Allais and Daniel Ellsberg to counter the dominant, Bayesian view established by Leonard Savage. The chapter places particular emphasis on Ellsberg’s introduction of the notion of ambiguity, a concept that proved crucial in creating a growing unease with respect to the dominant approach even among economists specializing in decision theory.

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Uncertainty as Ambiguity: Ellsberg and the Paradoxes of Decision Theory

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年

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  • Carlo Zappia

摘要

This chapter presents the so-called paradoxes of choice proposed by Maurice Allais and Daniel Ellsberg to counter the dominant, Bayesian view established by Leonard Savage. The chapter places particular emphasis on Ellsberg’s introduction of the notion of ambiguity, a concept that proved crucial in creating a growing unease with respect to the dominant approach even among economists specializing in decision theory.