Democracy and Citizenry Competence
摘要
Some contend that a process of collective decision-making cannot be justified, or its results legitimised, unless the citizens involved in the process are minimally competent. So there seems to be room for restricting the agents involved in such a process to the enlightened ones. Moreover, given that citizens are, since Plato’s time, often charged with epistemic incompetence, an epistocratic form of government suggests itself when considering political decision-making. This chapter, based partly on previous discussions, attempts to discourage the move to epistocracy by showing that the oft-noted citizenry incompetence can be overcome by exploiting the division of epistemic and cognitive labour already in place in our societies. However, for that to be the case, certain structural and personal conditions ought to hold, including importantly that the citizens possess a certain intellectual character, of which Socrates is a great exemplar. Moreover, given some plausible aims of the educational system, we put forward some reasons for it to foster this intellectual character. Finally, in order to avoid the criticism often made to Plato that his political-educational project is unrealisable, we consider the feasibility of educating for such character.