In contemporary political philosophy, Plato’s political project is regarded as a model of epistocracy. In this chapter, we set out to show that such a model does not necessarily lead to authoritarianism. Further, we argue that Plato’s view that a ‘real politician’ should be one in possession of virtue is perfectly compatible with some requirements that we believe our rulers should be able to meet. Moreover, although Plato’s political model is an epistocracy (and, as some critics suggest, an ‘elitist’ project), we claim that there is reason to think that the real political elite in Plato’s time were the rhetoricians (people usually paid by the rich) who tried to impose their view through persuasion at all costs. Plato takes for granted that the most relevant way of progressing as competent and good human beings is through exchanging and evaluating reasons (this is, in fact, the sense in which he maintains that ‘enquiry is shared’). Thus, he is not, we hold, too far from some basic views defended even by the foes of Plato’s epistocracy.

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Authority and Plato’s Epistocracy

  • Marcelo D. Boeri,
  • Leandro De Brasi

摘要

In contemporary political philosophy, Plato’s political project is regarded as a model of epistocracy. In this chapter, we set out to show that such a model does not necessarily lead to authoritarianism. Further, we argue that Plato’s view that a ‘real politician’ should be one in possession of virtue is perfectly compatible with some requirements that we believe our rulers should be able to meet. Moreover, although Plato’s political model is an epistocracy (and, as some critics suggest, an ‘elitist’ project), we claim that there is reason to think that the real political elite in Plato’s time were the rhetoricians (people usually paid by the rich) who tried to impose their view through persuasion at all costs. Plato takes for granted that the most relevant way of progressing as competent and good human beings is through exchanging and evaluating reasons (this is, in fact, the sense in which he maintains that ‘enquiry is shared’). Thus, he is not, we hold, too far from some basic views defended even by the foes of Plato’s epistocracy.