How does art communicate? A lot of literature is devoted to the idea that art communicates something by itself—that it has agency by itself—but in fact it is people who communicate, sometimes using the products of art. But what they communicate and the way they communicate is a product of the whole cultural context in which they live. These communications are embedded in what I define as six communications revolutions, which form the central core of the whole book. They involve what Marshall McLuhan (The medium is the message. In: Media and cultural studies, 2012 (1962), pp. 100–107) called “actual processes of thought.” I survey briefly the types of communications among non-human animals and point out that they do not generally result in conversations, but production and response depend very much on the context of communication. Generally speaking, non-humans do not respond to indexical signs of previous behavior of other animals. Most importantly, any suggestion that inanimate things actively send messages is confused, however appealing it might be, but inanimate things are often a third element of the interaction between two or more people (Schiffer, The material life of human beings: artifacts, behavior, and communication. Routledge, London, 1999). Finally, I survey the work showing the similarity between the semantic roles experienced by humans, capuchin monkeys, and chimpanzees emphasizing their interactions with stones and with art. Human use of stones leaves a material product that persists, and our use of art not only persists but can only be shown to be art with the process of thought I mentioned before. The Essay discusses how the creation of pictures necessarily involves interactions between producers and seers and the producers’ concerns about something material (the ocher and its impacts), as well as concerns about both non-material things of the mind (the song/story) and material things related to the place where the interaction happened (“the place of the story of the whale”).