This chapter introduces conceptual choice in medicine through three examples: cancer classification, obesity as a disease, and the definition of pain. Conceptual choice assesses concepts based on their goals, questioning whether specific goals are worth pursuing. Two objections are addressed. The implementation challenge argues that concepts are too entrenched to change, but conceptual work focuses on expert conceptions—definitions in guidelines and research protocols—that are stable, normative, and shaped by medicine’s procedural objectivity. The irrelevance objection, prevalent in the philosophy of medicine, dismisses conceptual work as unnecessary. This is countered by demonstrating that conceptual choice complements inquiries into the reality of phenomena, enriching health models and theories. The chapter concludes with the need to distinguish concepts from models.

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Conceptual Choice in Medicine

  • Elisabetta Lalumera

摘要

This chapter introduces conceptual choice in medicine through three examples: cancer classification, obesity as a disease, and the definition of pain. Conceptual choice assesses concepts based on their goals, questioning whether specific goals are worth pursuing. Two objections are addressed. The implementation challenge argues that concepts are too entrenched to change, but conceptual work focuses on expert conceptions—definitions in guidelines and research protocols—that are stable, normative, and shaped by medicine’s procedural objectivity. The irrelevance objection, prevalent in the philosophy of medicine, dismisses conceptual work as unnecessary. This is countered by demonstrating that conceptual choice complements inquiries into the reality of phenomena, enriching health models and theories. The chapter concludes with the need to distinguish concepts from models.