This chapter examines the evolution of Greece’s policies at the United Nations and in the Middle East in view of its accession to the EEC, shedding new light not only on Greek policies but also on the difficulties and contradictions of policymaking in an enlarged Community. Although every Greek vote at the UN was given with Cyprus in mind, and Athens tended to adopt more advanced positions on Middle East issues, it never tried to undermine or dispute the basic tenets of Western strategy. It was primarily the erosive influence that the Greek-Turkish dispute had on Greek foreign policy and Western cohesion that concerned and annoyed Western governments. However, in view of the sensitivity of Greek public opinion to everything that could undermine the ‘independent’ nature of Greek policies, Athens’ allies were very careful in their approach. Washington preferred to invest its political capital in its principal objective which was the restoration of NATO’s southern flank while the Nine, who had a great stake in preserving their ‘political acquis’, would discretely try to press the Greeks to align with their common positions only to find out that Athens had a remarkable ability to resist such pressures.