This chapter discusses the theme of suicide in Améry’s work with a particular focus on what it reveals about how the notion of freedom changes in his thought from the post-war period to the final years of his life in the 1970s. I bring Améry into dialogue with Albert Camus, the thinker of twentieth century existentialism most famously associated with the problem of suicide through his 1942 essay, The Myth of Sisyphus. Améry is more successful than Camus in achieving their shared aim: to discuss suicide from the individual perspective of the suicidal person. Améry’s success is in large part due to his concept of échec, which I subsequently argue carries all the burden and responsibility of Sartrean freedom, but none of its creative potential. Améry’s 1976 book On Suicide: A Discourse on Voluntary Death signals one of these definitive shifts away from Sartre. In it, Améry’s conception of freedom is more indebted to Schopenhauer, and to a lesser extent to Nietzsche, than to his former master, Sartre. Améry’s concept of échec also underscores a changing understanding of freedom in his thought, in which the burden of responsibility of Sartre’s ontological freedom remains but its creative capacity appears to be absent. Améry articulates a conception of freedom in On Suicide that is not necessarily inconsistent with Sartre, but that is a closer parallel with Schopenhauer’s theory of the Will and, to a lesser extent, Nietzsche’s “will to power.” On Suicide signals a definitive shift in Améry’s conception of freedom, one I claim is more indebted to Schopenhauer and his pessimistic orientation than it is to Sartre. Finally, I consider whether Améry’s pessimistic conception of freedom is at odds with his professed commitment to Enlightenment reason, a question that for the time-being I leave unresolved.