This Chapter is concerned with the place of science, specifically modern science, in African philosophy. More specifically, it is concerned with placing the work of Hountondji in conversation with the work of some of the most important figures in professional African philosophy in the second half of the twentieth century. In the previous chapters of this book, I have emphasized the important role that is played by the concept of modern science in the work of Hountondji. In this Chapter I contextualize Hountondji’s work, by showing how conceptions of modern science play an important role in the work of other African philosophers such as Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, and Kwame Anthony Appiah. In particular, all three philosophers draw on some conception of science in order to differentiate between “modern” and “non-modern” societies (frequently called “traditional”). They all argue that “modern societies” have institutionalized a modern scientific worldview in a way that “non-modern” societies have not. To this extent, all three philosophers are, like Hountondji, defenders of what I have described in Chap 1 . as the confident self-critical spirit of the 1960s and, just like Hountondji, they continued to defend this spirit well into the 1980s and the 1990s. In particular, they refused to concede defeat and to shift the goal posts so that the epistemic limitations of “traditional” modes of intellectual inquiry can come to be re-described as unique epistemic achievements based on a different set of evaluative standards.