This chapter first summarizes (and slightly recasts) the previous chapters by noting that they grounded a right to see or sense the world with technology in two larger constitutional rights: (1) A right to express oneself with technology, for example, by video recording and (2) A right to use one’s visual system—including technology integrated into it—behind constitutional shielding for one’s personal integrity and autonomy. The justification for the right becomes more tenuous, however, as one moves to forms of perceiving with technology that are more distant from the core of each of these rights. This chapter argues that those who think about perception with technology must therefore emphasize and understand the role of another set of interests that underlie many forms of seeing with technology: Our interest in what many writers call “cognitive liberty.”

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Cognitive Liberty, Privacy, and Extended Perception

  • Marc Jonathan Blitz

摘要

This chapter first summarizes (and slightly recasts) the previous chapters by noting that they grounded a right to see or sense the world with technology in two larger constitutional rights: (1) A right to express oneself with technology, for example, by video recording and (2) A right to use one’s visual system—including technology integrated into it—behind constitutional shielding for one’s personal integrity and autonomy. The justification for the right becomes more tenuous, however, as one moves to forms of perceiving with technology that are more distant from the core of each of these rights. This chapter argues that those who think about perception with technology must therefore emphasize and understand the role of another set of interests that underlie many forms of seeing with technology: Our interest in what many writers call “cognitive liberty.”