Inter-Institutional Competition and the Spitzenkandidaten Procedure: Third Time’s a Charm?
摘要
The 2024 European Parliament elections are the third instance of European elections taking place applying the Spitzenkandidaten procedure. Clearly, the initially intended legitimising effect of the Spitzenkandidaten was not achieved: the electoral system did not move towards a single legitimising logic for the Commission presidency in which the electoral result alone determines who will become Commission president. Instead, the double-legitimacy logic, represented by the need to negotiate an agreement between the Council and the EP has also remained in place. In the past two electoral rounds, these two legitimising logics were in competition with one another. Ultimately, however, the inter-institutional power struggle was decisive, with timing and inner-institutional coherence being the key factors to determine the winner. This chapter argues that while the presence of an incumbent Commission president running for re-election altered some of the political processes’ dynamics, this appointment round was once more defined by inter-institutional power, yet, this time recognised as the decisive procedure by the two competing institutions, leading to a number of paradoxical outcomes.