This chapter examines the performance-based payroll system in Russian universities based on the so-called efficiency contracts. An efficiency contract becomes the main protagonist of this chapter. By tracing its workings, I show how neoliberal modernization has been adopted by the state, often under the authoritarian-managerial patronage of Vladimir Putin. Efficiency contracts exemplify how neoliberal governance has infiltrated Russian institutions, extending beyond universities to all public services. Performance-based pay became a part of the state’s, and particularly Putin’s, personified project to increase the quality and prestige of Russian research and science in global academic competition. Success in the competition was evaluated, first and foremost, in terms of academic publishing output. The efficiency contract became a de facto extension of political power inside the universities, intertwining neoliberal ideals of efficiency and authoritarian governance. The chapter also discusses the contradictions of neoliberalism, which can lead to dangerous and violent outcomes. The neoliberal mechanism of efficiency, supported by economic incentives and supervised not only by the universities but by the state, produces possibilities for authoritarian practice. Efficiency is imposed and surveilled, leading to institutional regimes of discipline. When this authoritarian practice reverberates to the scale of the state, it reinforces state authoritarianism.