Positivism has been questioned for its methodological premises focused on quantification (second debate) and epistemological claims assuming the possibility of uncovering objectively truth and laws in the social world independently of actors’ representations and social position (see the fourth debate). Most post-positivist scholars have criticized the validity of positivist claims and have particularly targeted the ambition to propose general and value-free explanations. However, less attention has been paid to the question of how positivist data collection, methods and epistemology structures our interpretation and normative vision of international relations. In order to address this question, I will focus on how positivism frames the understanding of threat perceptions and international conflict. In particular, I am interested to probe into how conflict is predicted by positivist scholars and what kind of solutions they suggest—if any—in order to avoid them. I argue that by reducing individuals to coherent, measurable objects with strategic behavior, positivism may lead to exaggerated fear. This “alarmist” aspect of positivist scholarship comes hand in hand with the denial of individuality, complexity, contingency and room for social relations characterized by empathy, identification and trust. This article presents to my knowledge the first study that examines the elective affinities between positivism and international violence.