In this chapter, we analyze patterns of majority language acquisition within an economy consisting of a majority group and multiple minority groups. Our framework builds on the communicative benefits model by Selten and Pool (The distribution of foreign language skills as a game equilibrium. In Game Equilibrium Models IV: Social and Political Interaction (pp 64–87). Springer, 1991) and the Brock et al. (Econ Theory, Forthcoming, 2024) framework, which allows individuals to choose among three options: full learning, partial learning, or no learning of the majority language. The key innovation in our approach is the introduction of a conformity factor in language acquisition, where peer pressure and community status may outweigh communicative and economic incentives for some individuals. Notably, we identify a non-monotonic relationship between the level of conformity and the distribution of full learners, partial learners, and non-learners in equilibrium. This finding is significant for policy considerations, as small adjustments in language acquisition costs may unpredictably influence language acquisition patterns across minority groups.