This chapter offers an assessment of the six Christian evolutionary theodicies in Part II of this volume. It considers the different approaches of the authors, influenced by their chosen starting assumptions, methods of analysis, and intended audience. It shows that Murray and Collin are writing in conversation with atheism, and questions whether the bar for plausibility of their positions is set too low. The chapter proposes that the approach of Murray has similarities with the method advocated by Lakatos in the philosophy of science. It questions whether Collin has in fact set up proposals for rigorous Popperian testing, and what extent of support there is for extending a theosis-based theodicy to non-human creatures. The chapter then considers the only-way theodicy of Attfield and the aesthetic theodicy of Schneider, pointing out not only their strengths but also their potential weaknesses as strategies for defending the omnibenevolence of God. Last, the chapter explores the strategies of Boyd and Keltz, indicating that within the particular Kuhnian paradigms each represents, their theodicies are plausible, but questioning how attractive they would be to enquirers not working within those frames of reference—New Testament dualism in the case of Boyd, and neo-Thomism in the case of Keltz.