This chapter examines the question of insect consciousness and argues that Descartes was correct in his view that insects lack subjective experience. Several perspectives on the problem of animal consciousness are evaluated, including “theory-heavy” approaches like the global workspace theory, “theory-neutral” approaches that focus on behavioral and other similarities, and “theory-light” approaches that seek out clusters of cognitive abilities facilitated by consciousness. It is argued that all these approaches encounter the “dilemma of demandingness,” where insect capacities fail to meet human standards, leading to weaker evidence with less confidence. Nonetheless, insect behavior differs significantly from the typical expression of pain in humans; hence, they implement the causal role of pain only superficially, resembling unconscious reflexes rather than genuine subjective experience. This chapter also critically examines Michael Tye’s concept of “centered speciesism,” which prioritizes moral consideration based on biological relatedness. This view is arbitrary and leads to disastrous results, suggesting moral consideration should be based on morally significant traits, not biological relatedness. A concluding reflection on the problem of animal suffering for theism considers the potential scale of suffering in a world teeming with insects.