In this chapter, I deal with Lipps’s contribution to epistemology and logic, two closely related dimensions of his oeuvre that have been discussed by the scholarship, but never comprehensively and systematically. The fact that, as a rule, Lipps does not clearly distinguish between the two domains justifies discussing them together in the same chapter. I focus on two main topics: (1) the question of how Lipps envisioned the relationship of epistemology and logic to psychology, that is, the question of his psychologism and antipsychologism, and (2) his affective epistemology, that is, his reflections on the involvement of feelings in the acquisition, manifestation, elaboration, and justification of knowledge. Regarding the first issue, I propose an in-depth analysis of the psychologistic and antipsychologistic phases of his epistemology and logic, and of the transition between the two, without overlooking the ambiguities of his last epistemological-logical period. I discuss the evolution of his theories of judgment and object as a counterpoint to his fluctuating conception of psychology. Concerning the second issue, I comment on the evolution of Lipps’s views on the role of affectivity in epistemic processes, highlighting how he moved from a “strong” to a “weak” approach to affective epistemology.