This paper proposes a novel anonymity system called Encryption-less anonymity system (Easy). In contrast to the anonymity systems presented in earlier publications, which are primarily built on encryption layers, Easy is devoid of an encryption mechanism. The Easy anonymity system is built on Shamir’s threshold scheme for segmenting identities and a multipath routing algorithm for sending subpackets containing subidentities through disjoint paths. Identity reconstruction would be impossible if only a portion, under the threshold k, of subpackets was intercepted by an attacker or a group of coordinated attackers. The identities of the sender and receiver are rebuilt by the proxy node upon receipt of the at least k subpackets. The findings of the experimental evaluation reveal that the Easy anonymity protocol is resilient even in the presence of coordinated attackers in the network. Isolated attacks launched on Easy system would have no chance of succeeding when there are at least two disjoint paths between two corresponding anonymous nodes in the network.