The principle of human dignity has gained significant legal importance since the middle of the last century. Presently, there appears to be a solid consensus in acknowledging that human dignity is the ultimate foundation of human rights, an acknowledgment made by all International Declarations. However, there exist substantial disparities regarding both the content and the meaning ascribed to this principle, as well as its practical legal consequences. This has led some authors to affirm that we are faced with a notion empty of content or, at least, with little operationality in the legal realm. It is undeniable that, in the contemporary context, this principle is frequently used from exclusively rhetorical, ideological, utilitarian or political parameters. In this context, this work attempts to justify that, on this topic, the underlying problem is not whether or not the principle is being understood or interpreted in different and even contradictory ways, but rather whether the expression dignity responds to a real quality of the human being. If that quality really exists, it requires a linguistic term to be designated. Conversely, if human dignity were to be rejected, we would confront a void, facing a human reality lacking its corresponding linguistic expression.