The United States’ antitrust jurisprudence has historically maintained an unequivocal stance against horizontal agreements, reflecting deep-seated public and legislative antipathy toward cartelization. The unprecedented scale of the COVID-19 pandemic, however, has catalyzed a subtle yet significant shift in this established doctrine. The extraordinary challenges posed by the global health crisis necessitated novel approaches to market cooperation, compelling U.S. antitrust authorities to recalibrate their traditional stance toward competitor collaborations. This emergent phenomenon of ‘crisis cartels’—temporary collaborative arrangements among competitors during periods of acute market distress—presents a fascinating intersection of public health imperatives and competition law principles. This article presents a comprehensive analysis of the U.S. antitrust framework’s treatment of crisis cartels, examining the legislative foundation, judicial interpretation, and regulatory guidance that shape their legitimacy under exceptional circumstances. Through systematic examination of historical precedents and contemporary developments during the COVID-19 crisis, this study illuminates the emerging doctrinal flexibility while critically evaluating its implications for future antitrust enforcement. The analysis contributes to the scholarly discourse on the intersection of competition law and crisis management, offering insights into the delicate balance between maintaining competitive markets and addressing unprecedented public health emergencies.