Consciousness in AI: A Return to Fetishism or Technological Progress?
摘要
Patrick Butlin and Robert Long have recently proposed to analyze the possibility of conscious AI, granting computational functionalism plausibility (Butlin et al. 2023). To this end, they derived a series of properties from various theories compatible with functionalism and applied them to several LLMs. The authors concluded that no current AI system can be considered truly conscious, but they remain open to such a possibility. Is it just a matter of time before we see the first Terminator? Or is it simply a natural human tendency to attribute agency, intentions, and emotions to non-human entities? (Dennett 1987, Gray and Wegner 2012, Kahn et al. 2006, Krach et al. 2008, Sytsma 2014). We are going to question the use of the expression “consciousness” in artificial entities, discussing recent proposed meanings. Can artificial beings actually be conscious? In the light of reasoning by analogy, we will try to determine the possible reasoning errors underlying some over-attribution of certain human characteristics to AI. We will see then the risk of a return to a certain kind of fetishism by linked to anthropomorphism.