The tramway problem is a moral dilemma studied in psychology. It involves either saving five lives by sacrificing one life through an action (the so-called “utilitarian” response) or refusing to sacrifice one person for the benefit of five (the so-called “deontic” response). Within the Western population, most responses are utilitarian in the so-called lever condition, in which you have to pull a lever to deviate the trajectory of the train from the five people onto an alone victim. Whereas in the bridge condition, the action is to push an overweight person on the tracks to stop the train. There the majority of the responses are deontic. Instead of the refusal to break a moral code, the deontic choice could be motivated by a strong feeling of responsibility toward the victim we have to kill in order to save the others. A disengagement from this responsibility should lead to more utilitarian responses. We tested this hypothesis by adding two versions in which before acting, the approval of the sacrificed person is requested. Under these conditions, the responses are utilitarian in both scenarios.

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Discharge of Responsibility as an Enhancer of Utilitarian Choices

  • Maxime Bourlier,
  • Cassandra Leroux,
  • Hirofumi Hashimoto,
  • Kaede Maeda,
  • Hiroshi Yama,
  • Jean Baratgin

摘要

The tramway problem is a moral dilemma studied in psychology. It involves either saving five lives by sacrificing one life through an action (the so-called “utilitarian” response) or refusing to sacrifice one person for the benefit of five (the so-called “deontic” response). Within the Western population, most responses are utilitarian in the so-called lever condition, in which you have to pull a lever to deviate the trajectory of the train from the five people onto an alone victim. Whereas in the bridge condition, the action is to push an overweight person on the tracks to stop the train. There the majority of the responses are deontic. Instead of the refusal to break a moral code, the deontic choice could be motivated by a strong feeling of responsibility toward the victim we have to kill in order to save the others. A disengagement from this responsibility should lead to more utilitarian responses. We tested this hypothesis by adding two versions in which before acting, the approval of the sacrificed person is requested. Under these conditions, the responses are utilitarian in both scenarios.