Degrees of Intuition: Coherence in the New Dual Process Theory
摘要
Dual Process theories of reasoning (DPT) hold that we have the ability to think in two ways. The first is called intuitive and is characterised by its speed and automaticity. The second, known as deliberative, is slower and more costly in cognitive resources. However, it has the advantage of being conscious and therefore sometimes prevents us from falling into the traps to which the intuitive process is prone. Debates surround these theories, notably about the supposed exclusivity of the responses produced by each of the two processes, or about the mechanism behind the activation of the deliberative process. De Neys’ model attempts to answer these questions by rethinking the interaction between the two processes. This model posits competing intuitions which, when they cannot be separated to provide an answer, call on the deliberative process to determine which one to keep (or propose a new answer). Another recent change of perspective in the field of reasoning is the recognition that we generally reason under uncertainty, and therefore that the formal logic hitherto used as norm of rationality for deductive reasoning must be replaced by a coherence norm, advocated by de Finetti (1937). In this ‘New Paradigm’ (NP), a proposition is no longer simply true or false, but rather has a degree of belief associated with it, which can be reported as a probability. We propose to show how this new DPT model and NP are complementary.