EU member states who were forced to implement structural changes and austerity measures in exchange for financial support have suffered greatly as a result of conditionality during the Euro crisis. For the affected governments, conditionality has exacerbated the responsibility-responsiveness dilemma: They had to adhere to EU conditionality in order to stay in the Eurozone. However, because they implied the loss of tangible benefits and rights, the measures implement in compliance with EU standards were unpopular at home. As a result, governments faced the possibility of electoral punishment and struggled to communicate to their voters that they were attentive to their interests. By using blame avoidance techniques, governments can lessen this conundrum by separating the cause of the suffering endured by their citizens from their own acts. My goal in writing this book was to explain governments’ choice of blame avoidance strategy under EU conditionality. In this last chapter, I summarise the theoretical framework and the empirical insights together with their contribution to the literature on blame avoidance, the Euro crisis, and, more generally, government responsiveness in light of the increasing authority of international institutions. Furthermore, I point out the potential for further research that this book opens up.