This chapter analyses the blame avoidance strategies employed by the Irish government in three cases of reform required under the Programme conditionality. The cases vary with regard to the politicisation of the measures and the government’s reputation for policy support. First, Ireland’s introduction of a local property tax was highly politicised. The two governing parties had little to no reputation of supporting the measure. In line with the theoretical expectations, the analysis of blame avoidance strategies shows that the Irish government employed blame shifting more frequently than any other blame avoidance strategy. Second, the Irish water services reform was highly politicised. Unlike the property tax, the governing parties were known to favour the water services reform. The analysis of the government’s blame avoidance strategies demonstrates that, in this instance, the Irish government prioritised self-defence over other blame avoidance strategy. Third, unlike the two previous cases, there was little political backlash to the wage setting reform. The Irish government did not have a reputation for policy support. In line with the theoretical expectations, the government focused on circling the wagons rather than other strategies.

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Blame Avoidance Strategies in Ireland: Three Cases of Reforms

  • Lisa Kriegmair

摘要

This chapter analyses the blame avoidance strategies employed by the Irish government in three cases of reform required under the Programme conditionality. The cases vary with regard to the politicisation of the measures and the government’s reputation for policy support. First, Ireland’s introduction of a local property tax was highly politicised. The two governing parties had little to no reputation of supporting the measure. In line with the theoretical expectations, the analysis of blame avoidance strategies shows that the Irish government employed blame shifting more frequently than any other blame avoidance strategy. Second, the Irish water services reform was highly politicised. Unlike the property tax, the governing parties were known to favour the water services reform. The analysis of the government’s blame avoidance strategies demonstrates that, in this instance, the Irish government prioritised self-defence over other blame avoidance strategy. Third, unlike the two previous cases, there was little political backlash to the wage setting reform. The Irish government did not have a reputation for policy support. In line with the theoretical expectations, the government focused on circling the wagons rather than other strategies.